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WHAT IS AN INSTANCE OF AN ARTWORK?
ALEXEY ALIYEV
The expression ‘an instance of an artwork’ is often used in philosophical discourse about
art. Yet there is no clear account of what exactly this expression means. My goal in this
essay is to provide such an account. I begin by expounding and defending a particular
definition of the concept of ‘an instance of an artwork’. Next, I elaborate this definition –
by providing definitions of the main derivatives of the concept of ‘an instance of an
artwork’, namely the concepts of ‘a well-formed instance of an artwork’ and ‘a non-well-
formed instance of an artwork’. Finally, I examine the relation of the foregoing definitions
to the existence and identity conditions of artworks and make some additional remarks
concerning these definitions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The expression ‘an instance of an artwork’ is often used in philosophical
(primarily, ontological) discourse about art.1 But what exactly does this
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1 Here are some quotes that illustrate this use: Stephen Davies, ‘An Ontology of Art’, in
The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), 160: ‘Singular works must have one and only one instance. Multiple works
specified through an exemplar must also have at least one instance, though they may
have many more.’ John Dilworth, ‘The Abstractness of Artworks and Its Implications for
Aesthetics’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 66 (2008): 346: ‘Type theories are one
popular way in which to explain how a particular novel, musical composition, etc. could
have multiple copies or performances, yet still be such that all of its instances or tokens
are purely concrete items.’ Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory
of Symbols (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), 209: ‘All and only inscriptions and
utterances of the text are instances of the [literary] work.’ Andrew Kania, ‘The Philosophy
of Music’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, fall 2017 ed.
(Stanford University, 1997–), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/music/:
‘Music is perhaps the art that presents the most philosophical puzzles. Unlike painting,
its works often have multiple instances, none of which can be identified with the work
itself.’ Peter Lamarque, ‘Objects of Interpretation’, Metaphilosophy 31 (2000): 106: ‘What
occupies space on a shelf might be an instance or a copy of a work but cannot be the
work itself, for to destroy that copy would not be to destroy the work.’ Jerrold Levinson,
‘What a Musical Work Is’, Journal of Philosophy 77 (2011): 99: ‘My handwritten copy,
I would maintain, is an instance of Black’s poem.’ Christy Mag Uidhir, Art and Art-Attempts
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 167: ‘According to this standard account, our
interaction with such art-abstracta (e.g., Moby-Dick, the Eroica symphony) must be
mediated by their associated concrete instances or specifications (e.g., copies of Moby-
Dick on library shelves, performances of the Eroica in symphony halls).’ Joseph Margolis,
What, After All, Is a Work of Art? Lectures in the Philosophy of Art (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 98: ‘When the numbered exemplars of
a Dürer print are pulled from an inked plate, they normally count as instances of that
engraving.’ Aaron Meskin and Jon Robson, ‘Videogames and the Moving Image’, Revue
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expression mean? This question has received scant attention in 
the philosophical literature.2 Meanwhile, the question is doubtless important.
By answering it, we would improve our understanding of philosophical
discourse about art. Furthermore, an acceptable answer to it would provide
a philosopher of art with a tool that, at least in theory, would enable her to
establish whether an object is, or is not, to be categorized as an instance of an
artwork. Also, such an answer might have non-trivial implications concerning
certain ontological properties of artworks – primarily, the properties of
existence and identity.3 Finally, it might provide a means to resolve some
philosophical issues, such as the issue of whether all artworks are multiple in
nature and the issue of whether the novel can be treated as a performing art.4
My goal in this essay is to answer the question posed above. In particular,
I aim to define the concept of ‘an instance of an artwork’ as well as its
constituents – the concepts of ‘a well-formed instance of an artwork’ and ‘a
non-well-formed instance of an artwork’. I begin by defining ‘an instance of an
artwork’ (Section II). Next, I defend this definition against potential objections
and provide reasons to adopt it (Section III). Then I turn to defining 
the concepts of ‘a well-formed instance of an artwork’ and ‘a non-well-formed
instance of an artwork’ (Sections IV and V). Finally, I make a few additional
remarks regarding the concept of ‘an instance of an artwork’. In particular,
I define ‘a token of an artwork’, which is closely related to ‘an instance of an
artwork’, specify certain ontological implications of the definition of ‘an
instance of an artwork’, and provide an alternative formulation of this
definition (Section VI). 
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Internationale de Philosophie, no. 254 (2011): 554: ‘Multiple instance works (for example,
the novel The Name of the Rose) are types. Particular instances of such works (e.g., 
the copy of The Name of the Rose in the British Library) are tokens.’
2 The only explicit account of the expression ‘an instance of an artwork’ has been offered
by David Davies in ‘Multiple Instances and Multiple “Instances”’, British Journal of
Aesthetics 50 (2010): 411–26; ‘Enigmatic Variations’, Monist 95 (2012): 643–62; ‘Varying
Impressions’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (2015): 81–92. Some relevant
discussions related to this expression can be found in Catharine Abell, ‘Printmaking as
an Art’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (2015): 23–30; Hetty Blades, ‘Instantiating
Dance on Screen’, American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-Journal 7 (2015): 1–10,
http://www.asage.org/index.php/ASAGE/article/view/170/90; Gregory Currie, An
Ontology of Art (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989); Davies, ‘Ontology of Art’; K. E. Gover,
‘Are All Multiples the Same? The Problematic Nature of the Limited Edition’, Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (2015): 69–80.
3 For an illustration of this point, see Section VI, Remark 2.
4 For an explanation of how an account of ‘an instance of an artwork’ could be used to resolve
the issue of whether all artworks are multiple in nature, see Davies, ‘Multiple Instances’;
‘Enigmatic Variations’; ‘Varying Impressions’; for an explanation of how such an account
could be used to resolve the issue of whether the novel can be treated as a performing
art, see Alexey Aliyev, ‘What Instances of Novels Are’, Philosophia 45 (2017): 163–83.
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A remark concerning the existing alternatives to the account presented in
this essay. So far as I am concerned, the only explicit account of the nature of
the concept of ‘an instance of an artwork’ has been offered by David Davies. In
his view, something is an instance of an artwork just in case it (a) ‘makes
manifest to the receiver some or all of the experienceable properties bearing
upon its appreciation’5 or (b) stands in a particular ‘kind of historical-intentional
relation to the work’s history of making’6 – the relation that grounds the fact
that the work is the logically first product of the artist’s creative activity.7
However, this account has certain shortcomings. First of all, it appears
insufficiently informative, as some of the expressions it employs are not quite
clear. Thus, what exactly is meant by ‘some’ in clause (a)? Davies does not
provide an answer to this question. At the same time, in this case, possible
conventional answers are unsatisfactory. We do not want to understand ‘some’
as ‘at least one’, since an entity manifesting just one experienceable property
bearing upon the appreciation of an artwork does not have to be an instance of
this work (thus, a black cat makes manifest one of the experienceable
properties that bear upon the appreciation of Wassily Kandinsky’s Black
Relationship – the property of blackness – but, obviously, such a cat is not an
instance of this painting). And, for similar reasons, we do not want to take 
the meaning of ‘some’ to be equivalent to ‘a few’. So, given what has been said,
the meaning of ‘some’ in the given case is unclear. Meanwhile, without an
acceptable clarification of this meaning, Davies’s account of ‘an instance of an
artwork’ can hardly be called sufficiently informative. 
Furthermore, this account does not seem to fully accord with our linguistic
practice – in particular, with the actual use of the expression ‘an instance of an
artwork’.8 As is clear from what has been said in the previous paragraph,
according to Davies, something is an instance of an artwork if it stands in
a particular ‘kind of historical-intentional relation to the work’s history of
5 Davies, ‘Varying Impressions’, 81.
6 Davies, ‘Multiple Instances’, 414.
7 For a detailed description of this relation, see ibid.
8 The expression ‘instance of an artwork’ (as well as related expressions: ‘well-formed
instance of an artwork’, ‘genuine instance of an artwork’, ‘instance of a novel’, and
so on) is technical: It is used primarily by philosophers and is normally absent from
ordinary, non-philosophical discourse. Thus, if you go to a bookshop and ask the
salesman for an instance of War and Peace, he or she most likely will have a hard
time trying to figure out what it is exactly that you want. Similarly, many of those
who are not familiar with philosophy will be puzzled if they hear you say that you
have never listened to a well-formed instance of The Rite of Spring. In light of this,
in this essay, it is assumed that the actual use of the expression ‘an instance of an
artwork’ amounts to the actual use of this expression by philosophers. 
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making’.9 As a result, his account entails that there can be instances of artworks
that fail to make manifest to receivers many or even all of the experienceable
properties bearing upon the appreciation of these works. For example, an
artefact cast from the mould of a work of cast sculpture can be an instance of
this work even if it ‘has lost all of its detail through erosion and therefore no
longer has any capacity to play the experiential role in the appreciation of [the]
work’.10 However, this consequence seems to go against the actual use of the
expression ‘an instance of an artwork’. An overwhelming majority of theorists,
including Stephen Davies, Nelson Goodman, Jerrold Levinson, Guy Rohrbaugh,
and Nicholas Wolterstorff, would agree that to be an instance of an artwork, an
entity must provide at least some (and, presumably, sufficient) experiential
access to this work; if an entity fails to do that, then it cannot even be called ‘a
non-well-formed instance of this work’ – it should be categorized as something
that is not an instance of this work at all.11
The account I present in this essay, while similar to Davies’s account in some
respects, does not have the foregoing shortcomings. And, at the same time, it
does not seem to have any other shortcomings. In light of this, I am inclined to
think that it can help us substantially improve our current understanding of 
the concept of ‘an instance of an artwork’ and, as a consequence, achieve 
the results specified at the beginning of this essay.
II. DEFINING ‘AN INSTANCE OF AN ARTWORK’
As is clear from what has been said above, the central question of this essay is
the question ‘What is meant by “an instance of an artwork”?’, or, in other words,
‘How can “an instance of an artwork” be defined?’ To answer this question, let us
specify some characteristic features of an instance of an artwork.
What seems common to all instances of artworks is that they manifest
various properties of these works. Take, for example, an instance of Beethoven’s
Symphony No. 5 – for example, one of its correct performances. It manifests
certain properties of this symphony – primarily, the properties related to its
sound. Or consider an instance of the Mona Lisa – say, its original canvas. It
manifests certain properties of this painting, namely the properties concerned
What Is an Instance of an Artwork?
9 Davies, ‘Multiple Instances’, 414.
10 Davies, ‘Varying Impressions’, 91.
11 See Davies, ‘Ontology of Art’; Goodman, Languages of Art; Jerrold Levinson, ‘The Work
of Visual Art’, in The Pleasures of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1996), 129–37; ‘What a Musical Work Is, Again’, in Music, Art, and
Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics (New York: Oxford University Press,
2011), 215–63; ‘What a Musical Work Is’; Guy Rohrbaugh, ‘Artworks as Historical
Individuals’, European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003): 177–205; and Nicholas
Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
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with its colours as well as with what it depicts. Similarly, an instance of Leo
Tolstoy’s War and Peace – such as one of its correct readings12 – manifests
certain properties of this novel, including its sonic properties and properties
related to the semantic content.
Here, one might ask: What exactly is meant by saying that x manifests
a property? This question can be answered as follows: For all x, x manifests
a property just in case this property is apprehensible by directly perceiving x –
that is, by perceiving x with the help of one or more of our sensory faculties,
such as sight (vision), hearing (audition), taste (gustation), smell (olfaction), and
touch (somatosensation). Regarding this answer, two remarks are worth
making. First, the only thing that determines whether an entity manifests
a property is whether this property can be apprehended by perceiving this
entity with the help of at least one sensory faculty. Thus, a red apple manifests
the property of being red – since this property can be apprehended by
perceiving this apple with the help of the faculty of sight. At the same time, an
apple produced in Florida does not manifest the property of being produced in
Florida – because this property cannot be apprehended by perceiving this
apple with the help of any sensory faculties. 
Second, manifesting a property is not equivalent to having this property. 
For an object can have a property without manifesting it. Thus, an apple
produced in Florida has the property of being produced in Florida but, as
mentioned above, does not manifest this property. Similarly, a musical score
has the property of sounding a particular way but does not manifest this
property. (If it did, then at least some sonic properties could be apprehended
by perceiving it with the help of a sensory faculty. However, no sonic
property can be apprehended that way. In order for this to be possible, it
must be possible to hear a musical score. But no musical score can be heard,
since (a), strictly speaking, only sounds can be heard, and (b) a musical score
is not a sound – rather, it is a concrete sequence of notes and other
symbols.)13
Thus, given what has been said, one characteristic feature of an instance of
an artwork is that it manifests certain properties of this work. But what exactly
are these properties? It is reasonable to suppose that they are such that if they
are not experienced by us, then we will not be able to fully appreciate this work.
12 By ‘a reading’ here is meant a sequence of sounds generated as a result of reading
a text. For an argument in favour of the view that readings are instances of novels,
see Aliyev, ‘What Instances of Novels Are’.
13 Of course, we can meaningfully say that a musical score can be heard. But when we
say this, we do not mean that this score can literally be heard; what we mean is that
the sounds generated with its help (or perhaps the sounds it encodes) can be heard.
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In other words, they are properties that must be experienced for a complete
appreciation of the work. 
But now the following question arises: Is it necessary for an instance of an
artwork to manifest all the properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate this work? It may seem as though the right answer is ‘Yes’. But, in
fact, that is not the case. Consider Alexander Ivanov’s painting The Apparition of
Christ Before the People. It is reasonable to assume that to fully appreciate this
painting, it is necessary to learn about the process of creating this painting.14
Meanwhile, learning about this process is impossible without engaging
experientially with at least some of the properties of Ivanov’s preparatory
sketches (or so we can assume).15 Thus, experiencing these properties is
requisite for a full appreciation of The Apparition of Christ Before the People. But
they cannot be possessed by any instance of The Apparition – the original
canvas (and perhaps certain very good copies of this canvas) – and, hence,
cannot be manifested by an instance of this painting. 
Or, consider Beethoven’s Symphony No. 5. It can be plausibly argued that
a complete appreciation of this symphony requires an experiential engagement
with those experienceable properties that enable to grasp the history of its
composition. At the same time, these properties cannot be possessed by any of
the instances of Symphony No. 5 – particular musical performances – and,
hence, cannot be manifested by an instance of this symphony. 
Thus, the set of properties manifested by an instance of an artwork does not
necessarily involve all the properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate this work. But what, then, determines whether a property that must
be experienced to fully appreciate an artwork must be manifested by an
instance of this work? Presumably, the right answer is this: What determines
this is whether such a property falls under the category of properties through
which the primary content16 – that is, the set of ‘those contentful properties
that may be the ground of other contentful properties but which are not
What Is an Instance of an Artwork?
14 This assumption as well as its generalized version – that knowing the history of an
artwork’s creation is required to fully appreciate this work – are a direct consequence
of aesthetic contextualism – the view that ‘artworks are essentially historically
embedded objects, ones that have neither art status, nor determinate identity, nor
clear aesthetic properties, nor definite aesthetic meanings, outside or apart from 
the generative contexts in which they arise and in which they are proferred’. Jerrold
Levinson, ‘Aesthetic Contextualism’, Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 4 (2007): 4. For
a powerful defense of this view, see ibid. and Levinson, ‘What a Musical Work Is’.
15 This is not to say, of course, that learning about the creative process leading up to an
artwork – all the stops and starts, all the false turns, and so on – is always requisite to
full appreciation.
16 The term ‘content’ is used here in a broad sense – to refer to the overall artistic
content (and not just the semantic content).
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themselves grounded in contentful properties’17 – of the work is articulated: If
the property falls under this category, then it must be manifested by an
instance; otherwise, the property does not have to be manifested by this
instance. 
So, in light of what has been said so far, an instance of an artwork has 
the following characteristic features: (a) it manifests certain properties of 
the work, (b) these properties are such that they must be experienced to fully
appreciate the work, and (c) through these properties the primary content of
the work is articulated. Now, with the help of these features – and assuming
that the expression ‘primary properties’ denotes ‘properties through which 
the primary content of an artwork is articulated’ – ‘an instance of an artwork’
can be defined as follows: 
Definition of ‘an Instance of an Artwork’ (hereafter: ‘DIe’): For all x, x is an
instance of an artwork if and only if x manifests certain primary properties
that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work.18
Note that by DIe, the only thing that matters for being an instance of an
artwork is the manifestation of the relevant primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate this work: As long as an entity manifests such
properties, it is an instance of the corresponding work. Thus, consider, for
example, the original canvas of Kazimir Malevich’s Black Square and its
indiscernible counterpart that was created by someone completely unfamiliar
with Malevich’s works.19 According to DIe, since both the canvas and 
the counterpart manifest the same properties, they are both instances of Black
Square. Likewise, DIe entails that both a correct recitation of Robert Louis
Stevenson’s ‘To Friends at Home’ and its indiscernible counterpart produced by
someone who has never encountered Stevenson’s poetry (including ‘To Friends
at Home’) manifest the same properties and so are instances of this poem.20
17 Davies, ‘Multiple Instances’, 411. Alternatively, the primary content of an artwork can
be characterized as the set of the basic properties that determine the content of this
work.
18 Comp. Davies, ‘Multiple Instances’; ‘Enigmatic Variations’; ‘Varying Impressions’, in
particular his definition of ‘a purely epistemic instance of an artwork’.
19 Following Fisher, I define ‘an indiscernible counterpart’ as follows: For all x and for all
y, x is an indiscernible counterpart of y if and only if x and y share all of their manifest
properties (where a property is manifest just in case it is manifested by something).
See J. A. Fisher, ‘Is There a Problem of Indiscernible Counterparts?’, Journal of
Philosophy 92 (1995): 467–84.
20 It is assumed that the original canvas of Black Square and the recitation of the poem
‘To Friends at Home’ manifest the relevant primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding works.
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Does DIe, at least partially, reflect the existing meaning of the expression ‘an
instance of an artwork’?21 A number of philosophers of art use this expression
according to DIe with regard to at least some artworks. For example, Julian
Dodd uses it this way when he talks about instances of musical works, and
Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin use it this way with regard to instances of
notational artworks (such as literary and musical works).22 Given this, the
question posed above can be answered in the affirmative.23
However, although DIe reflects one of the existing senses of ‘an instance of an
artwork’, it does not reflect all of the senses of this expression there are. For,
besides the sense of ‘an instance of an artwork’ specified by DIe – which might
be termed ‘epistemic’ – in the relevant discourse (primarily, discourse
concerning the ontology of artworks), there exists another sense of this
expression, which DIe fails to capture. According to this latter sense – call it
‘relational’ – an instance of an artwork is not just what manifests certain primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work; rather, such
an instance has an additional characteristic feature – that of standing in an
appropriate historical-intentional relation to the work.24
Now, in the relevant discourse, the relational sense is rather common: It is
widely employed by a considerable number of philosophers, including Gregory
Currie, Arthur C. Danto, Stephen Davies, Andrew Kania, Jerrold Levinson, Ted
Nannicelli, and Richard Wollheim.25 Given this, it is clear that to be complete,
What Is an Instance of an Artwork?
21 By ‘the meaning of an expression’ here is meant the set of the senses of this
expression, not just one of these senses.
22 See Julian Dodd, ‘Musical Works as Eternal Types’, British Journal of Aesthetics 40
(2000): 424–40; Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin, Reconceptions in Philosophy
and Other Arts and Sciences (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). At the same time, according
to Goodman and Elgin, non-notational (analog) artworks, such as etchings and
paintings, do not have instances in the sense of DIe.
23 According to the terminology used in this essay, the fact that a definition reflects an
existing sense of an expression does not entail that this definition does that correctly.
Hence, one might ask: Does DIe reflect the corresponding sense of ‘an instance of an
artwork’ correctly? An answer to this question is provided in Section III.
24 The nature of this relation is elucidated later in this section.
25 See Currie, Ontology of Art; Arthur C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace:
A Philosophy of Art (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Davies, ‘Ontology
of Art’; Kania, ‘Philosophy of Music’; Levinson, ‘What a Musical Work Is’; Ted Nannicelli,
A Philosophy of the Screenplay (London: Routledge, 2013); and Richard Wollheim,
‘Painting as an Art’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 47 (1980): 281–84. To illustrate,
consider the following uses of ‘an instance of an artwork’ by Stephen Davies and Kania: 
‘Singular works must have one and only one instance. Multiple works specified
through an exemplar must also have at least one instance, though they may have
many more’ (Davies, ‘Ontology of Art’, 160).
‘Music is perhaps the art that presents the most philosophical puzzles. Unlike
painting, its works often have multiple instances, none of which can be identified
with the work itself’ (Kania, ‘Philosophy of Music’). 
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any account of ‘an instance of an artwork’ must provide a definition of this
expression used in the relational sense. What could such a definition be? 
Given what has been said above, ‘an instance of an artwork’ in the relational
sense (hereafter: ‘an instancer of an artwork’) has all the characteristic features
of an instance of an artwork in the epistemic sense (hereafter: ‘an instancee of
an artwork’) and, in addition to that, stands in an appropriate historical-
intentional relation to the work. Taking this into account, ‘an instancer of an
artwork’ can be defined as follows: 
Definition of ‘an Instance of an Artwork’ (hereafter: ‘DIr’): For all x, x is an
instance of an artwork if and only if x (a) manifests certain primary properties
that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work and (b) stands in an
appropriate historical-intentional relation to it.26
It is worth stressing that unlike being an instancee of an artwork, being an
instancer of an artwork requires not only manifesting certain primary properties
that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work but also standing in an
appropriate historical-intentional relation to this work. Thus, an indiscernible
counterpart of Malevich’s Black Square that was created by someone
completely unfamiliar with Malevich’s works is not an instancer of Black Square,
since this counterpart does not stand in any appropriate historical-intentional
relation to this painting. Similarly, an indiscernible counterpart of a recitation of
Stevenson’s ‘To Friends at Home’ produced by someone who has never
encountered Stevenson’s poetry (including ‘To Friends at Home’) is not an
instancer of ‘To Friends at Home’ because this counterpart does not stand in any
appropriate historical-intentional relation to this poem. 
Regarding DIr a natural question arises: What exactly is the appropriate
historical-intentional relation to an artwork in which an instancer of this work
must stand? An answer to this question can vary depending on what kind of art
Note that neither Davies nor Kania could use ‘an instance of an artwork’ in 
the epistemic sense here. If Davies did that, he would not be able to state that
singular art kinds must have just one instance (as in this sense, an artwork can always
have more than one instance). Likewise, if Kania used ‘an instance of an artwork’ in
the epistemic sense, then it would be impossible for him to assume that there is only
one instance in the case of a painting (for in this sense, a painting can have many
instances). 
26 Comp. Davies, ‘Multiple Instances’; ‘Enigmatic Variations’; ‘Varying Impressions’, in
particular the definition of ‘a provenential instance of an artwork.’ Note a crucial
difference between DIr and Davies’s definition of ‘a provenential instance of an
artwork’: Unlike the latter, DIr does not entail that something can be an instance of an
artwork without being an instancee of this work.  
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is under consideration. In the case of classical music, the historical-intentional
relation to an artwork in which an instancer of this work stands is usually
understood as the relation of being identical to a performance of this work
generated with the help of either the original score (that is, the score directly
created – say, written or typed – by the composer) or an entity that stands in
the ‘copy’ relation to this score (where x stands in the ‘copy’ relation to y just in
case x is a copy of y, or x is a copy of a copy of y, or x is a copy of a copy of a copy
of y, and so on). In the case of photographic art, the historical-intentional
relation to an artwork in which an instancer of this work stands is usually taken
to be the relation of being identical to a print derived from the original
photographic film or some other appropriate source (say, a photographic plate
or bitmap) created by the author. In the case of painting, the historical-
intentional relation to an artwork in which an instancer of this work stands is
typically treated as the relation of being identical to the original canvas.27 And
in the case of literature, the consensus is that the historical-intentional relation
to an artwork in which an instancer of this work stands is the relation of being
identical to the work’s original manuscript or an entity that stands in the ‘copy’
relation to this manuscript.28
What Is an Instance of an Artwork?
27 According to the view accepted by a considerable number of theorists, including
Jerrold Levinson, Guy Rohrbaugh, Amie L. Thomasson, Peter Kivy, Richard Wollheim,
and Nicholas Wolterstorff, a painting is identical to its canvas. If this view is true, then
the relation here is that of being identical to the painting. See Levinson, ‘Work of
Visual Art’; Rohrbaugh, ‘Artworks as Historical Individuals’; Amie L. Thomasson, 
‘The Ontology of Art’, in The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics, ed. Peter Kivy (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2004), 78–92; Wollheim, ‘Painting as an Art’; and Nicholas Wolterstorff,
‘Toward an Ontology of Art Works’, Noûs 9 (1975): 115–42.
28 Assuming that the foregoing treatment is correct, the concepts of ‘an instancer of
a work of classical music’, ‘an instancer of a photographic work’, ‘an instancer of
a painting’, and ‘an instancer of a literary work’ can be defined, respectively, as follows: 
For all x, x is an instancer of a work of classical music if and only if x (a) manifests
certain primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work and
(b) stands in the relation of being identical to the work’s performance generated with
the help of a score that is either the original score (that is, the score directly created
by the composer) or an entity that stands in the ‘copy’ relation to this original score.
For all x, x is an instancer of a photographic work if and only if x (a) manifests certain
primary experienceable properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this
work and (b) stands in the relation of being identical to a print derived from the
original photographic film or some other appropriate source (say, a photographic
plate or bitmap) created by the work’s author.
For all x, x is an instancer of a painting if and only if x (a) manifests certain primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this painting and (b) stands
in the relation of being identical to the original canvas.
For all x, x is an instancer of a literary work if and only if x (a) manifests certain primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work and (b) stands in
the relation of being identical to the work’s original manuscript or an entity that
stands in the ‘copy’ relation to this manuscript.
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It should be noted that the foregoing interpretations of the appropriate
historical-intentional relation to an artwork in which an instancer of this work
must stand are not claimed to be correct. In fact, although these interpretations
are widely accepted, they may well be misguided. The interpretation provided
in the case of classical music implies that an instancer of a work of classical
music must be a performance. But why can’t an instance of such a work be
something other than a performance – say, a playing of a recording of
a performance or a reproduction of a performance (that is, a particular
sequence of sounds generated by some electronic device with the help of
a musical score)? Similar questions arise with regard to the interpretations
given in the case of painting and photographic art. According to the
interpretation given in the case of painting, a painting has only one instance,
namely the canvas. But why can’t a painting be instanced not only by its canvas
but also by something else – say, certain copies (for example, molecule-for-
molecule duplicates) of this canvas? The interpretation provided in the case of
photographic art assumes that the only instances of photographic artworks are
prints. But why can’t photographic artworks be properly instanced by things
other than prints – say, copies of prints? Finally, it can be questioned whether
the interpretation given in the case of literary works is right in identifying
instances of literary works with either original manuscripts or their copies.29
(What has been said here is not intended to show that the mentioned
interpretations are, in fact, misguided. The goal is to suggest that these
interpretations could be misguided.) 
III. EVALUATING THE DEFINITION
Let us now turn to the question of whether DIr/e is acceptable. As is generally
agreed, to define x is to explicate the meaning of x by specifying a set of
conditions that (a) are satisfied by all entities that actually fall under x and only
by such entities and (b) are sufficiently informative – in particular, (1) are not
enumerative (that is, do not amount to a disjunctive list of objects that fall
under x), (2) do not involve a vicious circle (that is, do not explicitly or implicitly
contain the concept being defined), and (3) do not contain meaningless
expressions or expressions whose meanings cannot be understood. In light of
this, Dir/e could potentially be rejected on the grounds that it is insufficiently
informative or on the grounds that it does not cover all of those entities that fall
under ‘an instance of an artwork’ and only such entities. But there is no real
reason to question the sufficiency of the informativeness of DIr/e. One could
29 In ‘What Instances of Novels Are’, I provide an argument showing that this
interpretation is wrong in doing that.
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object, of course, that DIr/e is insufficiently informative because the meaning of
the word ‘certain’ is unclear. But this objection can easily be defused by
referring to the material of the next two sections – in particular, the definitions
of ‘a well-formed instance of an artwork’ and ‘a non-well-formed instance of an
artwork’ – where the sense of ‘certain’ is precisified. It could also be objected
that DIr/e is insufficiently informative, since the definiens contains part of the
concept being defined – namely, the concept of ‘an artwork’. Yet this objection
fails, as it is based on a false assumption – that the goal of DIr/e is to define ‘an
instance of an artwork’ (that is, both of the concepts involved). In fact, however,
its goal is to define ‘an instance of an artwork’, or, in other words, ‘an instance’ as
it is used in the context of being ‘of’ an artwork – in particular, (a) an artwork in
general, or (b) some kind of artwork, such as a novel, a musical work, or
a sculpture, or (c) some specific artwork, for example, the Mona Lisa or War and
Peace.
A more pressing objection to DIr/e draws upon the idea that it does not cover
all of those entities that fall under ‘an instance of an artwork’. Suppose some
entity E makes available for experience the primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate some artwork A (where y makes x available for
experience just in case y makes it possible to experientially engage with x either
by directly perceiving x or by perceiving x as a result of applying a special skill,
that is, a skill that is not acquired in a natural way – such as the skill of reading
or the skill of playing a musical instrument). Suppose next that E does not
manifest these properties. Then DIr/e entails that E is not an instance of A. Is this
entailment true? Given the actual use of the expression ‘an instance of an
artwork’, (a) to be an instancee of an artwork, it is sufficient to make available for
experience the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate
this work, and (b) to be an instancer of an artwork, it is sufficient (i) to make
available for experience the primary properties that must be experienced to
fully appreciate this work and (ii) to stand in an appropriate historical-
intentional relation to this work. In light of this, E is an instancee of A. Moreover,
assuming that E stands in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to A, E is
an instancer of A. Thus, the foregoing entailment is false – and, as a result, DIr/e
fails to cover all of those entities that fall under ‘an instance of an artwork’. 
This objection is based on the thesis that the actual use of the expression ‘an
instance of an artwork’ supports the account of ‘an instance of an artwork’
according to which (a) if x makes available for experience the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate an artwork, then x is an
instancee of this work, and (b) if x (i) makes available for experience the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate an artwork and (ii)
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stands in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to it, then x is an
instancer of this work. Is this thesis true? Suppose there is a score S of a work of
classical music M such that by applying to S a particular special skill – namely,
the skill of silent score reading – one can imagine, and, hence, experientially
engage with, a performance of S that manifests the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate M.30 Then S makes available for
experience the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate M. Furthermore, it can be assumed that S stands in an appropriate
historical-intentional relation to M. Given this, if the foregoing account of ‘an
instance of an artwork’ is true, then S is an instancer/e of M. However, this result
does not correspond to the actual use of the expression ‘an instance of an
artwork’, since according to this use, scores of works of classical music are not
instances of these works (the consensus is that instances of works of classical
music are solely musical performances).31
Alternatively, that the foregoing account of ‘an instance of an artwork’ does
not accord with the actual use of the expression ‘an instance of an artwork’ can
be shown as follows. Suppose there is a verbal description V of some very
simple drawing D – say, a drawing of a black square. Suppose also that by
applying a special skill – namely, the skill of reading – to V, one can mentally
form, and, hence, experientially engage with, an accurate image of D – an
image that makes it possible to perceptually grasp the primary properties
that must be experienced to fully appreciate D. Then V makes available for
experience the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate D. Furthermore, it can be assumed that V stands in an appropriate
historical-intentional relation to B. Thus, if the definition of ‘an instance of an
artwork’ being discussed is true, then V is an instancer/e of B. However, this does
not accord with the actual use of the expression ‘an instance of an artwork’,
since according to this use, no verbal description of a drawing is an instance of
this drawing. 
Thus, the foregoing alternative account of ‘an instance of an artwork’
contradicts the actual use of the expression ‘an instance of an artwork’. As
a result, the thesis that the actual use of this expression supports this account is
30 Many musical scores are too complex for score reading. So S is not any musical score.
31 Thus, Levinson writes: ‘Those familiar with recent reflection on the ontological
question for works of art will know of the widespread consensus that a musical work
is in fact a variety of abstract object – to wit, a structural type of kind. Instances of this
type are to be found in the individual performances of the work’ (Levinson, ‘What
a Musical Work Is’, 5–6). In the same way, the consensus view on the nature of 
the entities that serve as instances of musical works is described in Kania, ‘Philosophy
of Music’. 
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false. Meanwhile, if this thesis is false, then, since, as already mentioned, 
the objection being discussed is based on this thesis, this objection fails. 
Are there any other potentially successful objections to the idea that DIr/e
covers all and only those entities that fall under ‘an instance of an artwork’?
No – or so it seems. As a result, given that, as already mentioned, there are no
successful objections to the idea that DIr/e is sufficiently informative, there
seems no reason to reject this definition. At the same time, there is reason to
consider it satisfactory. First, as mentioned above, it satisfies one of the criteria
of a successful definition – that of being sufficiently informative. Furthermore,
there is a strong consideration in favour of the view that it also satisfies 
the second criterion – that of covering all and only those entities that fall under
the expression being defined. As mentioned in Section II, many theorists use
the expression ‘an instance of an artwork’ according to DIr, with regard to all
artworks, while some use it according to DIe, with regard to at least some
artworks. Thus, there is good reason to hold that DIr/e reflects the actual use of
this expression. Meanwhile, if that is the case, then this definition covers all and
only those entities that fall under ‘an instance of an artwork’.
IV. DEFINING ‘A WELL-FORMED INSTANCE OF AN ARTWORK’
Now that we have shown that DIr/e is acceptable, let us elaborate it further. Note
that DIr/e does not specify whether an instancer/e of an artwork is capable of
manifesting all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate this work. Can such an instancer/e (in principle) manifest all such
properties? Apparently, the only plausible reason to answer ‘No’ is that there are
no entities capable of manifesting all the primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate artworks. But this reason is unsatisfactory. 
If there are no entities capable of manifesting all the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate artworks, then no artwork can be fully
appreciated. But this consequence is doubtless false. A complete appreciation
of an artwork may be hard, but in an overwhelming majority of cases, it is, 
at least in principle, possible. (This is not to say, of course, that every artwork can
be fully appreciated. First of all, a full appreciation is normally impossible in 
the case of artworks that no longer exist. Thus, we cannot fully appreciate 
the University of Vienna Ceiling Paintings by Gustav Klimt – Philosophy,
Medicine, and Jurisprudence – which are believed to have been destroyed by
retreating German SS forces in 1945 – as the available information about these
paintings, including the information derived from the relevant photographs
and preparatory sketches, is insufficient to enable us to do that. Furthermore,
besides the case of complete destruction, it is often impossible to fully
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appreciate an artwork in another case – when the work has been considerably
damaged. To illustrate, consider the original drawing by Willem de Kooning that
forms the basis of Robert Rauschenberg’s Erased de Kooning Drawing. This
drawing could perhaps be characterized as existing, but it is too deformed 
to afford a complete appreciation, and the available information about 
the drawing is too scarce to make it possible for us to fully appreciate it.)
So, there seems no real reason to think that an instancer/e of an artwork
cannot manifest all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate this work. At the same time, there is a good reason to uphold 
the opposite thesis – that an instancer/e of an artwork can, in principle, manifest
all of these properties. The reason is that according to the consensus among
ontologists of art, for most (though not all) artworks, there, in fact, existed, exist
now, or will exist instancesr/e that manifest all the primary properties that must
be experienced to fully appreciate these works. Thus, taking into account what
has been said, it is reasonable to conclude that there can be instancesr/e of an
artwork that are capable of manifesting all the primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate this work.
Given the foregoing result, we are justified in adding to DIr/e the definition of
‘an instancer/e that can manifest all the primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding artwork’ – or, in other words,
the definition of ‘a well-formed instancer/e of an artwork’:32
Definition of ‘a Well-formed Instancee of an Artwork’: For all x, x is a well-
formed instancee of an artwork if and only if x manifests all the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work. 
Definition of ‘a Well-formed Instancer of an Artwork’: For all x, x is a well-
formed instancer of an artwork if and only if x (a) manifests all the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work and (b)
stands in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to it. 
V. DEFINING ‘A NON-WELL-FORMED INSTANCE OF AN ARTWORK’
The only difference between well-formed instancesr/e of an artwork and
instancesr/e of an artwork is that well-formed instancesr/e manifest all
the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate the work,
whereas instancesr/e manifest certain primary properties that must be
32 This kind of instancer/e could also be characterized as ‘strict’, ‘genuine’, ‘perfect’, or
‘ideal’.
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experienced to fully appreciate the work. In light of this, one might ask: Are 
the class of instancesr/e and the class of well-formed instancesr/e coextensive?
Put otherwise, are all instancesr/e well-formed? Consider a slightly damaged
print of a photograph or a musical performance that contains one incorrect
note. Clearly, neither the performance nor the print provides access to all
the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate 
the corresponding works. But, at the same time, both the print and 
the performance provide access to a significant set of such properties. As
a result, it seems reasonable to think that both of them can be (a) non-well-
formed instancese and – assuming that each of them can stand in an
appropriate historical-intentional relation to the corresponding work – (b) non-
well-formed instancesr. And, in fact, most of those who employ the concept of
‘an instance of an artwork’ (primarily, ontologists of art) do think so. Given this,
the above question, I think, should be answered in the negative.
In light of the fact that the class of instancesr/e is not exhausted by well-
formed instancesr/e, a natural question arises: How can ‘a non-well-formed
instancer/e of an artwork’ be defined? As is clear from what has been said in 
the previous paragraph, a non-well-formed instancer/e of an artwork manifests
only some of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate this work. Can this fact alone be used to define ‘a non-well-formed
instancer/e of an artwork’? No – for there are entities that (a) manifest only some
primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate an artwork but
(b) are not instancesr/e of this work. Consider, for example, a black and white
image of a typical colour painting (such as Auguste Renoir’s Luncheon of the
Boating Party). Such an image cannot manifest any colour properties.
Meanwhile, such properties are doubtless among the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate a typical colour painting.33 So a black
and white image cannot manifest all the primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate a typical colour painting. But such an image can
manifest some of these properties – for example, those that are concerned with
the shapes of what is depicted in this painting. Thus, a black and white image
can manifest some of the properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate a typical colour painting. At the same time, as is generally agreed, no
such image can be an instancer/e of such a painting.
So, what distinguishes non-well-formed instancesr/e of artworks from entities
that are not such instances? Taking into account the art-ontological context,
What Is an Instance of an Artwork?
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this question, I think, can be answered as follows: Unlike entities that are not
instancesr/e of artworks, non-well-formed instancesr/e of artworks (a) manifest
sufficiently many, though not all, of the primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate these works and (b) can, in principle, manifest
all sensory kinds of such properties (where ‘a sensory kind of property’ denotes
any kind of property that is relevantly concerned with a sensory modality –
visual properties [that is, properties related to vision], auditory properties
[properties related to hearing], olfactory properties [properties related to
olfaction], and so on). Given this, ‘a non-well-formed instance of an artwork’ can
be defined in the following way: 
Definition of ‘a Non-Well-Formed Instancee’: For all x, x is a non-well-formed
instancee of an artwork just in case x (a) manifests sufficiently many, though
not all, of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate this work and (b) could, in principle, manifest all sensory kinds of
such properties. 
Definition of ‘a Non-Well-Formed Instancer’: For all x, x is a non-well-formed
instancer of an artwork just in case x (a) manifests sufficiently many, though
not all, of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate
this work, (b) could, in principle, manifest all sensory kinds of such properties,
and (c) stands in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to this work. 
Note that one of the features that any non-well-formed instancer/e must
possess is the feature of being, in principle, capable of manifesting all sensory
kinds of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate
the corresponding artwork. Thus, a performance of a musical work that contains
an incorrect note but can, in principle, manifest all sensory kinds of the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work can be a non-
well-formed instancer/e of this work. At the same time, given some plausible
assumptions, a playing of an audio recording of a live performance of a work of
classical music cannot be a non-well-formed instancer/e of at least some
classical musical works. Such a playing, being non-visual, cannot, in principle,
manifest any visual properties.34 Meanwhile, the primary properties that must
34 Note that what is said here applies only to playings of ‘audio only’ (non-video)
recordings. Perhaps playings of audio-video recordings – recordings that capture
both the sonic and the visual aspects of a performance – can manifest all the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding works. For
a discussion of this possibility, see Christy Mag Uidhir, ‘Recordings as Performances’,
British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (2007): 298–314.
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be experienced to fully appreciate a work of classical music often include certain
visual properties.35 So, in some cases, a playing of an audio recording of a live
performance of a work of classical music cannot manifest all sensory kinds of
the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work.
Likewise, a soundless screening cannot be a non-well-formed instancer/e of
a sound film. The primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate such a film include particular sonic properties. But no soundless
screening can manifest any such properties. So, no such screening can manifest
all sensory kinds of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate a sound film. 
Here, one could object as follows: The foregoing definition implies that
being, in principle, capable of manifesting all sensory kinds of the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate an artwork is necessary
to be a non-well-formed instance of this work. However, this implication is false.
There can be non-well-formed instances that can manifest only some of 
the sensory kinds of the mentioned properties. 
Is this objection successful? It assumes that it is possible for a non-well-
formed instance of an artwork to be incapable of manifesting all sensory kinds
of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this
work. This assumption, however, is problematic. According to a widely accepted
view, non-well-formed instances of artworks are slightly incorrect well-formed
instances of these works.36 Meanwhile, a slightly incorrect well-formed instance
of an artwork is doubtless capable of manifesting all sensory kinds of 
the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work.
So, if the above-mentioned view is true – and there seems no reason to think
otherwise – non-well-formed instances of artworks must be, in principle,
capable of manifesting all sensory kinds of the primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate these works.
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35 For evidence that can be used to support this claim, see Vincent Bergeron and
Dominic McIver Lopes, ‘Hearing and Seeing Musical Expression’, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 78 (2009): 1–16; Stephen Davies, Musical Works and
Performances: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001);
Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002); Mag
Uidhir, ‘Recordings as Performances’; and Bence Nanay, ‘The Multimodal Experience
of Art’, British Journal of Aesthetics 52 (2012): 353–63.
36 Proponents of this view include David Davies, Stephen Davies, Jerrold Levinson,
Christy Mag Uidhir, Richard Wollheim, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. See David Davies,
‘Multiple Instances’; ‘Enigmatic Variations’; ‘Varying Impressions’; Stephen Davies,
Musical Works and Performances; Levinson, ‘What a Musical Work Is’; ‘What a Musical
Work Is, Again’; Mag Uidhir, Art and Art-Attempts; Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects:
With Six Supplementary Essays, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1980); and Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art.
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Here is another consideration against the assumption being discussed. If this
assumption is true, then there must be non-well-formed instances that are, in
principle, incapable of manifesting all the sensory kinds of the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding
artworks. What entities could serve as such instances? Here are some possible
candidates: 
(a) a silent screening of a sound film; 
(b) a playing of the sound of a film; 
(c) a silent performance of a sound play; 
(d) a purely sonic performance of a play; 
(e) a purely sonic performance of a musical; 
(f ) a silent performance of a musical. 
But can (a)–(f ), in fact, serve as non-well-formed instances that are, in
principle, incapable of manifesting all the sensory kinds of the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding
artworks? To be such instances, (a)–(f ) must satisfy two conditions. First, they
must be, in principle, incapable of manifesting at least one sensory kind of 
the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate the
corresponding artworks. Second, they must manifest sufficiently many, but not
all, of these properties. There is no doubt that (a)–(f ) satisfy the first condition.
But do they satisfy the second one? Prima facie, (a)–(f ) can manifest sufficiently
many of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate
the corresponding artworks only if perceiving (a)–(f ) enables us to adequately
(though, of course, not fully) appreciate these works. However, we cannot
adequately appreciate a sound film solely by watching its silent screening or
solely by listening to its sound; likewise, we are unable to adequately
appreciate a sound play or a musical just by watching their silent performances
or just by listening to the sound of their performances. Thus, there is good
reason to hold that (a)–(f ) do not manifest sufficiently many primary properties
that must be experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding artworks.
Meanwhile, if this is so, then (a)–(f ) cannot be non-well-formed instances. 
Now, what has been said about (a)–(f ) can, I think, be said about any other
potential candidates for the role of non-well-formed instances that are, in
principle, incapable of manifesting all the sensory kinds of the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding
artworks. So, there are no non-well-formed instances that are, in principle,
incapable of that – and, hence, the assumption being discussed is false. 
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VI. FINAL REMARKS
In closing, a few additional remarks: 
Remark 1: In the philosophical literature, there is an expression that is closely
related to ‘an instance of an artwork’ – namely, ‘a token of an artwork’. This latter
expression could be defined as follows: For all x, x is a token of an artwork just
in case (a) this work is a type (where a type can be understood as an entity that
can have multiple instancesr/e) and (b) x is its instancer/e.
Remark 2: The account presented in Sections II–V has certain implications
with regard to the existence and identity conditions of artworks. Suppose this
account is true. Then: 
(1) The fact that an instancer/e of an artwork does not exist does not entail
that this work does not exist.37
Substantiation: Suppose there is no performance, reproduction of
a performance, or playing of a recording of a performance of some musical
work M. Then there are no instancesr/e of M. Suppose next that there is an
encoding of M – say, a copy of M’s score or a recording of a performance of M.
Does M exist in this case? Prima facie, the answer is ‘Yes’. M exists qua an entity
that is, in some sense, ‘contained’ in that encoding. Thus, a musical work can
exist even if there are no instancesr/e of this work.
(2) If (a) there is an instancer of some artwork A and an instancer of some
artwork B and (b) these instances (i) manifest the same primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate A and B and (ii) stand in the same
historical-intentional relation to A, then A is identical to B.
Substantiation: Suppose there is an instancer of some artwork A and an
instancer of some artwork B. Suppose next that these instances (i) manifest
the same primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate
A and B and (ii) stand in the same appropriate historical-intentional relation
to A. Then, since nothing can stand in an appropriate historical-intentional
relation to more than one artwork, both of them must be instancesr of one
and the same work. But if this is so, then A must be identical to B. 
(3) The fact that (a) there is an instancee of some work A and an instancee of
some work B and that (b) these instances manifest the same primary properties
that must be experienced to fully appreciate A and B does not entail that A and
B are identical.
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Substantiation: Consider Brahms’s Piano Sonata Opus 2 (1852) and an
(imaginary) ‘work identical with it in sound structure, but written by Beethoven’:
Brahms’s Piano Sonata Opus 2 (1852), an early work, is strongly Liszt-influenced, as any
perceptive listener can discern. However, [the] work identical with it in sound
structure, but written by Beethoven, could hardly have had the property of being
Liszt-influenced. And it would have had a visionary quality that Brahms’s piece does
not have.38
Given what has been said, the foregoing works are not identical. Suppose now
that there are some instances, I1 and I2, that manifest all the primary properties
that must be experienced to fully appreciate Brahms’s work. Then, since, by
assumption, Beethoven’s work is identical in its sound structure to Brahms’s
work, I1 and I2 also manifest all the primary properties that must be experienced
to fully appreciate Beethoven’s work. Thus, it is possible (a) for an instancee of
an artwork A and an instancee of an artwork B to manifest the same primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate A and B and (b) for
A and B to be non-identical.
(4) If (a) there is an instancer/e of some work A and an instancer/e of some
work B and (b) these instances manifest non-identical sets of primary
properties, then it cannot be inferred that A and B are non-identical.
Substantiation: Suppose there is an instancer/e of A and an instancer/e of B.
Suppose next that the primary properties manifested by the instancer/e of
A and the primary properties manifested by the instancer/e of B are not 
the same. Then, of course, these instances are not identical. But they can
nevertheless be instancesr/e of the same artwork, since each of them can
manifest different sufficient sets of the primary properties of the same work
and stand in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to this work. Thus, in
this case, A and B are not necessarily non-identical. 
Remark 3: Given what has been said in Sections IV and V, DIr/e can be
formulated in a way other than the way it is formulated in Section II. As
shown in Sections IV and V, an instancer/e of an artwork can be well-formed or
non-well-formed. At the same time, there can be no instancesr/e other than
the well-formed and the non-well-formed. In light of this, as well as the
definitions of ‘a well-formed instancer/e of an artwork’ and ‘a non-well-formed
instancer/e of an artwork’, ‘an instance of an artwork’ can alternatively be
defined as follows: 
38 Levinson, ‘What a Musical Work Is’, 12.
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Definition of ‘an Instancee of an Artwork’: For all x, x is an instancee of some
artwork A if and only if x is either: 
– a well-formed instancee of A – an entity that manifests all the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate A; or 
– a non-well-formed instancee of A – an entity that (a) manifests sufficiently
many, but not all, of the primary properties that must be experienced to
fully appreciate A and (b) could, in principle, manifest all sensory kinds of
these properties. 
Definition of ‘an Instancer of an Artwork’: For all x, x is an instancer of some
artwork A if and only if x is either: 
– a well-formed instancer of A – an entity that (a) manifests all the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate A and (b) stands in
an appropriate historical-intentional relation to A; or 
– a non-well-formed instancer of A – an entity that (a) manifests sufficiently
many, but not all, of the primary properties that must be experienced to
fully appreciate A, (b) could, in principle, manifest all sensory kinds of
these properties, and (c) stands in an appropriate historical-intentional
relation to A.
Clearly, the foregoing formulation provides a more detailed account of ‘an
instance of an artwork’ than the formulation given in Section II. It should be
underlined, however, that the former formulation does not differ extensionally
from the latter one; that is, these formulations cover exactly the same set of
entities.
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